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Abstract: The objective of this study is, on one 
hand, to determine whether the banking crises 
occurring in advanced economies in the 1990s 
and 2000s share the same roots, and on the other 
hand, whether aggregated accounting indicators 
are good predictors of crises in these economies. 
By means of the multivariate logit model, we 
have identified banking crises indicators for 
a set of 16 developed countries for the periods 
1990-2006 and 2007-2012. Our results show 
the existence of certain similarities between 
the crises of the 1990s and 2000s, namely: a 
private credit boom and a deterioration of 
banks’ balance sheets. In addition, we have 
tested the robustness of our results through the 
use of Bayesian averaging models. Our results 
have allowed us to confirm, in general, the 
robustness of the estimation results derived from 
the multivariate logit approach.
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Introduction
The global financial system experienced a serious crisis in July 2007. This crisis, initially 
affecting the American housing market, gradually spread to the entire global financial 
system. The crisis not only caused the default of some of the world’s largest banking 
institutions, but was also at the root of a worldwide financial crisis comparable to that 
of the Great Depression of 1929. 
The 2007-2008 banking crises have been the subject of numerous controversies as to 
their similarities and differences to past banking crises. Some claim that the recent crises 
are different in every aspect. They are chiefly due to a global savings glut and the absence 
of shadow banking system regulation (Adrian and Shin, 2009). Others maintain that 
the recent episodes of banking distress are not so different from the previous ones 
and that the latter show remarkable similarities to the former. According to Claessens 
and al. (2010b), these similarities are: First, the price of real and financial assets rising 
considerably in a number of countries before the crisis, notably in the United States 
and Europe. These prices reached 60% before the start of the crisis, which strongly 
recalls the price spike observed during major financial crises of the ‘90s, notably the 
Japanese crisis of 1997 (Caballero, 2010). A second similarity is the occurrence, in 
a number of major economies, of credit booms before the crisis, estimated at over 
150% of GDP (Claessens and al., 2010b). Third, international financial integration 
facilitated large capital inflows, which contributed to the acceleration of GDP growth 
and massive credit growth, which in turn led to a strong fluctuation of global demand 
and a strong deterioration of current bank balances during the period preceding 
the crisis (Cardarelli and al., 2010). Fourth, the inadequacy of the regulation and 
prudential supervision framework (Bair, 2009). 
In light of these findings, the goal of this study is twofold. First, to determine if the 
banking crises of the 2000s have shared causes with the crises of the 90s, and second, 
to determine if aggregated accounting indicators are robust banking crisis indicators.
Thus, in this study we propose first to identify banking crisis indicators by means of 
a limited dependent logit approach for a cross-sectional view of advanced economies 
during the period preceding the 2007-2008 banking crises, namely 1990-2006, 
and the period 2007-2012. Second, we propose to test the robustness of the results 
derived from the multivariate logit approach, by means of Bayesian statistics (BMA). 
Indeed, according to Cuaresma and Slacik (2009) and Babecký and al. (2012), the 
BMA approach has the advantage of reviewing different model combinations and of 
weighting them according to their adjustments in the model. 
This paper will be organized as follows: The first section being an introduction, in the 
second section we briefly present a review of the literature on banking crisis indicators. 
In the third section, we present our methodology, namely: our country sample and our 
main data sources, our endogenous and exogenous variables, and our two econometric 
approaches. In the fourth section, we present a brief descriptive analysis of our data. 
We describe and discuss in the fifth section our empirical results. The last section is the 
conclusion.
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Financial Crisis Indicators: Review of the Literature 
Banking crises are not limited to the 21st century. Indeed, during the past four decades, 
the global economy was marked by an increase in banking crises. According to Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2013), banking crises represent a threat to equal opportunity amongst 
emergent and advanced economies: most countries have had at least one banking crisis 
during the period of 1945-2008.
The reoccurrence of these crises, their magnitudes and their surprising and unpredictable 
character, and the financial costs associated with these episodes explain the research 
communities’ interest in these events. They all attempt to define and to identify the 
risks and vulnerability factors of the banking sector in order to avoid the triggering of 
new crises, or to find adequate methods for the management and the prevention of this 
phenomenon before it reaches a catastrophic scale.
The first approaches, used for the detection of turbulence episodes, were based on 
country risk rating systems (Hawkins and Klau, 2000).Since the seventies, new 
techniques have been emerging, based on identifying early warning financial crisis 
indicators. The most commonly used methods for panel data limited dependent 
probit/logit models. The goal of this approach is to test the statistical significance of 
different indicators in determining the occurrence probability of a financial crisis across 
a cross-section of countries (Frankel and Saravelos, 2012). 
The indicators commonly used in the empirical literature are: macroeconomic 
indicators, financial indicators, external indicators, and institutional and structural 
indicators. The pioneering work done in this field of research is that of Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998b, 2005), Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu (1999) and Eichengreen 
and Arteta (2002). The results of their research suggest that a weak macroeconomic 
and financial environment marked by small GDP growth, a high increase in real 
interest rates, excessive credit growth, and strong inflation significantly increase the 
probability of the occurrence of banking crises at the international level. Recently, 
Frankel and Saravelos (2012) have conducted a vast review of the literature including 
over 80 works. The results of this investigation are reported in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Leading Indicators Deemed Relevant Financial Crises in more than 80 Works 
Source : Frankel and Saravelos (2012,  p.218)
From this figure, we see that the indicators that are most frequently statistically 
significant are the real exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves, credit growth, GDP, 
and the measurement of international trade. Nonetheless, the balance of payments, 
the terms of trade, contagion and institutional variables, capital flow variables, and the 
various measures of external debt do not seem to be robust early warning indicators of 
financial crises.
Furthermore, few empirical works have tested the relevance of microeconomic indicators 
linked to the individual situation of banks in the growth of banking distress probability. 
These indicators generally reflect the health and solidity of banking institutions and 
are grouped into five groups forming the acronym CAMEL (CAMEL refers to the 
five main components of the real situation of a banking institution, namely: Capital 
Adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity). In addition, CAMEL 
is a tool allowing for the detection of potential risks that could lead to bank failures 
and, by extension, banking crises. Muhammad (2009) argues that the strength of these 
factors determines the global solidity of the bank. 
The works of Gonzalez-Hermosillo and al. (1997), Männasoo and Mayes (2009) 
and Barrell and al. (2010) allowed the isolation of several conventional bank strength 
measures, derived from CAMEL, considered relevant to the detection of potential 
risks that could lead to serious problems in the banking sector, notably: (i) the ratio of 
capital to total assets; (ii) the ratio of non-performing loans or loan-loss provisions to 
total loans; (iii) the ratio of costs to revenue; (iv) the ratios of return on equity (ROE) 
and return on assets (ROA); (v) and the ratio of deposits to total assets, etc.
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Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
This study considers a sample of 15 advanced countries and covers the period of 
1990-2012. Our data is mainly extracted from the following databases: The World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bankscope and the work of 
Laeven and Valencia (2013).
Overview of Study Variables
Definition and Construction of the Endogenous Bank Crisis Variable
A key element in our study is the construction of the binary banking crisis variable 
for our sample of countries. We have therefore identified and dated the episodes of 
financial distress during the 1990-2012 period, referring mainly to the list of Laeven 
and Valencia (2013). 
According to them, a banking crisis is considered systemic if the following two 
conditions are met: “(1) significant signs of financial distress in the banking system 
and/or bank liquidations; and (2) significant banking policy intervention measures in 
response to significant losses in the banking system. 
Political interventions in the banking sector are considered important if at least three 
out of six measures have been used: “(1) extensive liquidity support; (2) significant bank 
restructuring costs; (3) significant bank nationalization; (4) the setting up of important 
safeguards; (5) significant asset purchases; (6) freeze on deposits and declaration of 
bank holidays.” (P. 228).
Table 1 gives the dates of banking distress episodes identified by this method for each 
country in our sample.
Table 1. Sample of Countries and Dates of Banking Crisis
Countries Dates of the Banking crises
Germany 2008-2011
Austria 2008-2011
Belgium 2008-2011
Korea 1997-1998
Denmark 2008-2011
United-States 2007-2011
Finland 1991-1995
Greece 2008-2011
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Ireland 2008-2011
Italy 2008-2011
Japan 1997-2001
Netherlands 2008-2011
United Kingdom 2007-2011
Spain 2008-2011
Sweden 1991-1995 ; 2008-2011*
Notes: * non-systemic banking crisis 
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2013, p. 254-256)
Thus let  be the dummy variable for banking crises that takes on a unit value the first 
year when a banking distress episode is identified in a country i, and a null value 
otherwise. Indeed, to the extent to which banking distress episodes occur an average 
of once per four years, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) thus suggest to keep 
only the first year of a given crisis.
                                                                                                         (1)
Exogenous Banking Crisis Variables
The choice of exogenous variables comes both from the empirical literature and data 
availability. 
We have grouped our explanatory variables in four distinct categories, namely: 
The macroeconomic variables, which are: the stock returns of key market indices 
adjusted by the dividends  (returnst), the growth of gross domestic product (gdpgt), real 
exchange-rate change (vtcrt), and the real exchange rate (rirt).
Financial variables, which are: private credit (privcreditt), the ratio of credit to bank 
deposits (ratiocreditdepositt), and the ratio of deposits to the money supply M2 
(ratiodepositm2t).
The aggregated accounting variables (The aggregation and weighting depend on the size 
of the bank balance sheets for each country in our sample), which are: the ratio of cost 
to bank revenue (ratiocostrevenut), the ratio of capital to total bank assets (ratiocapitalt), 
and the ratio of return on equity (roet).
As well as the external variables, which are: opening up to international trade (opnesst), 
the ratio of external debt to GDP (exterdebtt), the ratio of money supply M2 to 
international exchange reserves (m2rest), and the flow of foreign direct invest mean to 
GDP (dfit).
 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � = 1   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 =  0    𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  
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In Table 2, we have presented various financial crisis indicators covered in this study 
with the sign of the theoretical link expected between each variable and the occurrence 
probability of a banking crisis and the source of collected data.
Table 2. Sources and Data Descriptions
Categories Indicators Descriptions Sources Expected Signs
Macroeconomic 
variables
returns
Returns on equity 
indices Bloomberg -
gdpgt
Growth pf the gross 
domestic production IFS -
vert
Change in real 
exchange rate IFS +
rirt Real interest rate IFS +
Categories Indicators Descriptions Sources Expected Signs
Financial variables
privcreditt
Growth of the credit 
to the private sector WDI +
ratiocredidepositt
Ratio of bank lending 
to bank deposits IFS +
ratiodepositm2t
Ratio of bank de-
posits to the money 
supply M2
-
Accounting  vari-
ables
ratiocapitalt
Ratio of capital to 
total assets Bankscope -
roet Financial profitability ratio Bankscope -
ratiocostrevenuet
Cost to earnings bank 
ratio Bankscope +
External variables
exterdebtt
Ratio of external debt 
to GDP IFS +
opnesst
Trade openness 
measured by the 
sum of exports and 
imports to GDP
WDI -
m2rest
Money supply M2 
to International 
exchange reserves
WDI +
dfit
Foreign direct 
investment portfolio 
as a percentage of 
GDP
WDI +
Source: Authors’ own work
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Furthermore, several indicators, such as, for example, the variables reflecting bank asset 
quality, the budgetary deficit, the current account deficit, and institution quality and 
judicial system quality, have not been kept in this study because of data unavailability.
Econometric Approaches
The purpose of this study is to determine, on one hand, if the banking crises of 2007-
2008 in advanced economies share the same origin as the crisis episodes of the 90s, 
and, on the other hand, to determine whether aggregated accounting indicators are 
robust banking crisis indicators in these economies.
To do this, we propose, first, to identify banking crisis indicators by means of a limited 
dependent variable logit approach. Second, we propose to test the robustness of results 
derived from this approach by means of Bayesian statistics (BMA).
In the following, we propose to present briefly these two methods.
Limited Dependent Variable Logit Models
Limited dependent variable logit models were introduced by Eichengreen and al. 
(1994) and Frankel and Rose (1996). Unlike the “signals” approach, the logit/probit 
limited dependent variable models provide an explanatory probability simultaneously 
for the group of explanatory variables in question. Similarly, these models allow one 
to take into account the marginal contribution of each variable to crisis event genesis. 
In addition, the empirical literature validates the relevance of these models in the 
identification of financial crises in the case of panel data (Davis and Karim, 2008). 
The model is as follows:
                                                                                                                        (2)
Where i=1,…, N and t=1,…, T
The explanatory variable  is a binary variable that has a value of 1 during crises and 0 
otherwise;  is the vector of N coefficients relative to explanatory variables to estimate; 
is the matrix of explanatory variables; and  is the residual matrix.  identically and 
independently distributed and follows the logistic distribution. 
The Cumulative distribution function is given by:
                                                                                                                        (3)
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ ) = 𝐹𝐹(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽) 
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The likelihood function associated with this model is written as follows:
                                             
                                                                                                                        (4)
                                                                                  
                                                                                                                           (5)
             
The logarithm associated with the likelihood function is written as follows:
                                                 (6)
The occurrence probability of the crisis is a function that is obtained by the maximum 
likelihood method.
Formally, the crisis probability is as follows:
                      (7)
Bayesian Model Averaging 
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) has the advantage that it takes into account different 
model combinations, weighting them according to their adjustments in the model. In 
addition, the BMA approach provides for each variable an estimate of their coefficients 
as weighted averages of all models included in the model-space (If we have k variables, 
the model space will consist of 2k models) . Thus, the weighting coefficients correspond 
to the posterior probability of inclusion in each model in the model-space. 
The only existing works using this approach in the domain of early warning financial 
crisis indicators are those by Cuaresma and Slacik (2009), Babecký and al. (2012), 
Boudebbous and Chichti (2013) and Feldkirche (2014).
We use the BMA approach to identify banking crisis indicators in a list of potential k 
indicators. We consider the following linear regression model:
         
                     (8)
Where  is a binary financial crisis variable; is the constant;  is a coefficient vector;   refers 
to a subset of all the relevant and available explanatory variables, namely, potential early 
warning indicators X the fixed effects component;  and  is the white noise error term.
 
𝐿𝐿 = ��𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ )𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=1  
 
𝐿𝐿 = ��𝐹𝐹(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽)𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 [1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽)] (1 −  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ ) =  𝑒𝑒𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽  
 𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 + 𝑋𝑋𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾 + 𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀 
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The number K of potential explanatory variables gives 2K potential models. The 
indicator γ is used to refer to a specific model among the 2K models. Thus, an average 
is then calculated from the information originating from the model, by using the a 
posteriori probabilities of the model implemented by the Bayes Theorem:
                                                                                                                  (9)
                        
With is the posterior probability of the model, which is proportional to the marginal 
likelihood of the model . It facilitates the dating of the model’s a priori probability
The robustness of a variable in the explanation of the dependent variable can be 
expressed by the probability that a given variable will be included in the regression. It is 
assimilated to the posterior inclusion probability (PIP), which is calculated as follows:
                                                                                  
         (10)
Only variables with a PIP greater than or equal to 0.5 are considered robust determinants 
of the dependent variable. 
Descriptive Analysis of the Data
Our sample has 15 countries. Our choice was, on one hand, due to data availability 
and, on the other, to the fact that these countries have had serious banking crises 
during the past decades.
We use the panel data with annual frequencies relating to the periods 1990-2006 and 
2007-2012. 
Figure 2 provides a few stylized facts on the banking crises of our sample. We conclude 
that during the 90s, the frequency of these crises was relatively low, with a maximum 
of 4 crisis episodes. However, the 2000s were characterized by a higher frequency of 
banking crises, with a maximum of 16 crisis episodes.
 𝑝𝑝�𝑀𝑀𝛾𝛾�𝑦𝑦,𝑋𝑋� ∝ 𝑝𝑝�𝑦𝑦�𝑀𝑀𝛾𝛾 ,𝑋𝑋� 𝑝𝑝 (𝑀𝑀𝛾𝛾) 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃 = 𝑝𝑝�𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾 ≠ 0�𝑦𝑦� = � 𝑝𝑝�𝑀𝑀𝛾𝛾�𝑦𝑦�
𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾≠0  
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Figure 2. Frequency of Financial Crises in Advanced Economies over the Period 1990-
2012
Source: Authors’ calculations
In Table  3 are descriptive statistics of the study’s set of variables. The analysis of 
descriptive statistics reveals that for the two periods of the study, certain explanatory 
variables such as: the market index returns , the exchange rate variation, (), private 
credit (), the ratio of credit to bank deposits (), the ratio of deposits to the M2 money 
supply (), the ratio of return on equity (), the ratio of costs to bank revenue (), opening 
to international trade (), the ratio of external debts to GDP () and the ratio of the M2 
money supply to international exchange reserves () on the considered period show very 
significant fluctuations in comparison to other variables. Furthermore, the number of 
observations varies from one variable to another because of data unavailability.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Period 1990-2006
BCIt 255 0.0156863 0.124503 0 1
Returnst 236 6.282372 23.5557 -50.4519 183.365
gdpgt 244 2.079508 2.134638 -7.52457 8.71127
rirt 245 1.707938 2.321738 -5.46483 10.5684
vert 235 0.2941392 12.52485 -18.3922 107.034
privcreditt 252 140.4538 79.90097 48.1827 497.532
ratiocreditdepositt 224 121.7227 48.81322 50.5599 305.278
ratiodepositm2 175 77.38498 15.84425 38.1715 104.132
ratiocapitalt 194 5.925373 2.115559 1 17
roet 182 7.593985 13.54288 -2 19
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ratiocostrevenut 188 63.37078 18.55205 12.004 79.056
m2rest 250 28.01272 52.41858 3.54092 630.376
exterdebtt 255 62.84706 31.94798 9 164
opnesst 255 71.86413 37.42231 15.924 183.624
dfit 242 3.055958 4.71857 -5.89528 26.6532
Period 2007-2012
BCIt 90 0.4888889 0.502677 0 1
Returnst 76 3.050686 23.7773 -67.5697 183.365
gdpgt 90 1.511482 2.616534 -8.97498 8.71127
rirt 68 1.380545 2.252967 -5.46483 10.5684
vert 90 0.7454545 12.56793 -18.3922 107.0336
privcreditt 90 139.8145 62.4631 48.1827 346.21
ratiocreditdepositt 64 124.2889 50.35807 47.2884 313.334
ratiodepositm2 70 74.30398 16.55875 38.1715 104.132
ratiocapitalt 71 5.941463 2.035587 1 17
roet 75 5.519231 25.38191 -4 19
ratiocostrevenut 74 61.52309 16.13664 12.004 85.254
m2rest 90 35.09396 67.12172 2.61948 656.961
exterdebtt 72 64.26606 33.69485 9 189
opnesst 88 76.88712 39.75442 15.924 192.407
dfit 89 3.33932 5.461651 -6.71487 36.4308
Note: Mean, Std. Dev, Max and Min, respectively denote the average, standard 
deviation, maximum and minimum.
Source: Authors’ own work
We have used Pearson’s correlation test to detect if there are collinearity problems. The 
results of these tests are presented in Table 4. Simultaneously, we have included in our 
regressions all the variables because all the coefficients are less than 50% for the two 
periods of the study.
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Table 4. Correlation Matrices
a. Period 
1990-2006
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) 1
(2) 0.4408* 1
(3) 0.1093 0.0461 1
(4) 0.1029 -0.0899 0.0177 1
(5) -0.1872* -0.2714* -0.2547* -0.0081 1
(6) -0.0563 -0.0227 -0.0742 0.1053 -0.0801 1
(7) 0.0569 0.0144 0.2123* 0.018 0.1098 -0.4110* 1
(8) 0.0668 0.0508 -0.0627 -0.0693 -0.0741 -0.068 0.0796
(9) 0.1447* 0.3914* -0.0073 -0.0196 -0.0986 0.0468 -0.1506*
(10) -0.0379 -0.0556 0.4153* 0.1154 0.0029 -0.1229 0.1914*
(11) -0.0726 -0.0891 -0.2183* -0.0333 0.2314* 0.1612* -0.2899*
(12) 0.0165 -0.1769* -0.0051 -0.0162 0.2112* -0.4661* 0.3404*
(13) 0.0174 0.0043 -0.2948* 0.0115 -0.1959* 0.2928* -0.4796*
(14) -0.0109 0.0575 -0.2293* 0.0439 -0.0598 0.1555* -0.2211*
 Variables (8) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15)
(8) 1
(9) 0.1039 1
(10) -0.2583* -0.1667* 1
(11) -0.0672 0.0047 -0.3029* 1
(12) -0.0182 -0.1495* 0.1746* -0.1440* 1
(13) -0.3886* -0.0111 -0.2706* 0.2253* -0.1044 1
(14) -0.1816* -0.0085 -0.2410* 0.3240* -0.1133* 0.4605* 1
b. Period
2007-2012
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) 1
(2) 0.2846* 1
(3) 0.0407 -0.0928 1
(4) 0.2220* -0.078 0.0722 1
(5) -0.0955 -0.3159* -0.0928 0.0276 1
(6) -0.0315 0.036 -0.1176 0.0663 -0.0879 1
(7) -0.0118 -0.0286 0.2693* 0.1183 0.2086* -0.3870* 1
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(8) 0.0249 0.1266 -0.0282 -0.0566 -0.0107 -0.0103 0.0732
(9) 0.0897 0.2839* -0.1236 0.101 -0.0255 0.2810* -0.2233*
(10) -0.0102 -0.1479 0.4554* 0.1429 0.094 -0.1538 0.2502*
(11) 0.0464 0.022 -0.2306* -0.0285 0.1409* 0.048 -0.2848*
(12) 0.1098 -0.1566* 0.0674 0.0307 0.1017 -0.4570* 0.2848*
(13) 0.0864 0.1051 -0.3401* -0.0358 -0.2637* 0.2227* -0.4417*
(14) 0.0819 0.1321* -0.3082* 0.0677 -0.1238 0.1600* -0.2706*
 Variables (8) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15)
(8) 1
(9) 0.0579 1
(10) -0.2221* -0.4460* 1
(11) -0.0356 0.2037* -0.2059* 1
(12) -0.1034 -0.1138 0.1880* -0.1383 *  1.0000
(13) -0.3437* 0.1446 -0.3210* 0.0977 -0.0333 1
(14) -0.1063 0.1011 -0.2132* 0.215 * -0.1388* 0.4721* 1
Notes:(1):returnst; (2): gdpgt; (3): rirt; (4): vert; (5): privcreditt; (6): ratiocreditdepositt; 
(7): ratiodepsiotm2;  (8): ratiocapitalt; (9): roet; (10): ratiocostrevenut; (11): m2rest; 
(12): exterdebtt;  (13): opnesst; (14): dfit; and (*) means that the coefficients of correlations 
are significant at the threshold of 5%.
Source: Authors’ own work
Empirical Results and Discussion
We remember that the objective of this study is to determine, on one hand, whether 
the banking crises occurring in advanced economies in 2007 and 2008 have shared 
roots with past crisis episodes, and, on the other hand, to test the contribution of 
aggregated accounting indicators in explaining these crises.
We have identified, first, by means of multivariate logit models for a set of developed 
countries during the periods 1990-2006 and 2007-2012, the early warning banking 
crisis indicators.
Our estimation approach is as follows: First, in model (a) we have included only 
macroeconomic indicators. Then, in model (b) we have simultaneously integrated 
our macroeconomic and financial indicators. Finally, in model (c) we have introduced 
at the same time our macroeconomic, financial, and external indicators. Second, we 
have reestimated models (b) and (c) by introducing aggregated accounting indicators, 
namely models (d) and (e).
Model (a): Macroeconomics indicators
              (11)
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Model (b): Macroeconomics and financial indicators 
          (12)                 
Model (c): Macroeconomics, financial and external indicators 
         
                     (13) 
Model (d): Macroeconomics, Financial and accounting indicators
  
                    (14)                 
Model (e): Macroeconomics, financial, accounting and external indicators 
                   
         (15)
In the first place, we have estimated the set of these models on the two considered 
periods by means of fixed effects and random effects methods. In the second place, we 
have used the Hausman test to choose between these two methods. The results of this 
test validate the relevance of the fixed effects estimation method, since the chi-square 
probability of the Hausman test is significant at 1%.
The estimation results of models (16) and (17) are given in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
Model (16) concerns the estimation results of the period 1990-2006, while model (17) 
focuses on estimation results of the period 2007-2012.
Finally, we have evaluated the predictive quality of our set of models. The choice of a 
critical threshold, namely the critical probability above which the supervisor emits an 
alert, is inspired by the work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). These authors suggest 
the use of a critical threshold that minimizes the noise-to-signal ratio, unlike Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (2005), who suggest the use of the sample crisis frequency.    
The results of the test show that model (16.e) has a greater predictive power than 
models (16.a), (16.b), (16.c), and (16.d). Indeed, model (16.e) emits fewer false 
alarms than the other models (namely 37.14 %) and also has a lower noise-to-signal 
ratio (namely, 0.44). Thus, the specification that brings together the macroeconomic, 
financial, accountable, and external indicators seems to be the one best suited for the 
period 1990-2006.
Thouraya Boudebbous
94 Journal of Economic and Social Studies
Similarly, the results of this test show that model (17.d) has a better predictive power 
than models (17.a), (17.b), (17.c), and (17.e). Indeed, model (17.c) emits more 
accurate alarms (namely 69.00 %) and also has a lower noise-to-signal ratio (namely 
0.71). This suggests that a specification that takes into account macroeconomic, 
financial and accounting indicators would appear to be the most appropriate for the 
period 1990-2012.
The estimation results of model (16.e) suggest that economic downturn characterized 
by a growth of real GDP and real interest rates and appreciation of the real exchange 
rate are robust banking crisis indicators at 1%. This supports the work of Borio and al. 
(2010) who argue that the banking crises from the 90s in the Nordic countries can be 
considered twin episodes because they were all found to correspond with simultaneous 
exchange rate crises. Indeed, in 1992, fears of devaluation of the Swedish krona and the 
Finnish markka triggered various speculative attacks against these currencies. To deal 
with these attacks and to defend their respective currencies, these countries significantly 
raised their interest rates, by more than 60% in Sweden and 15% in Finland, which 
significantly increased the fragility of the banking sector and the recession (Borio and 
al., 2010). 
Similarly, the estimation results of model (17.e) suggest that a private credit boom, a 
decrease in the capital ratio and the growth of the ratio of costs to bank revenue are 
good indicators of banking crises. This suggests that the erosion of banking capital and 
the growth of banking charges are precursors of banking crises, which is in agreement 
with the work of Hays and al. (2009), Männasoo and Mayes (2009) and Barrell and 
al. (2010).
Table 5. Estimation Results of Logit Models of Banking Crises over the Period 1990-
2006
Model (16) :  Dependent Variable 
Variables Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) Model (d) Model (e)
Returnst
   -2.05**
(-0.029840)
0.45
(0.048122)
0.33
(0.036936)
1.41
(0.062829)
  1.41
(0.050549)
gdpgt
-2.48** 
(-0.622514)
-1.65*
(-0.532871)
-1.74*
(-0.647875)
-1.67*
(-0.546290)
-2.96***
(-0.45918)
rirt
3.46*** 
(0.092888)
2.79**
(0.086240)
  2.82***
(0.142907)
2.55**
(0.274048)
3.06 ***
(0.336072)
vert
1.14
(0.010512)
1.20
(0.028499)
0.41
(0.037164)
0.49
(0.048735)
2.31**
(0.068359)
privcreditt
2.82***
(0.072654)
1.93*
(0.065686)
1.65*
(0.110718)
1.90*
(0.087406)
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ratiocreditde-
positt
-2.41**
(-0.007815)
-1.52
(-0.004154)
-0.20
(-0.003208)
1.34
(0.003546)
ratiodepositm2
-3.43***
(-0.280375)
-2.93***
(-0.47593)
-1.79*
(-0.328627)
-0.78
(-0.530227)
ratiocapitalt
-0.85
(-0.592645)
-1.98*
(-0.603392)
roet
-0.96
(-0.05384)
0.33
(0.047863)
ratiocostrevenut
1.75*
(0.177059)
2.64***
(0.153894)
m2rest
0.77
(0.02900)
-2.07**
(-0.02951)
exterdebtt
1.09
(0.005670)
-0.18
(-0.009407)
opnesst
2.34**
(0.228135)
2.33**
(0.165604)
dfit
 -0.23
(-0.137445)
1.13
(0.125702)
Number of 
crises
3 3 3 3 3
Observation 158     120 116 104   98
Log-likelihood -38.99 -26.19 -20.05 -11.01 -9.78
LR chi2 29.10 49.98 60.88 45.07 37.76
 chi2 of 
Hausman test 
12.10 19.32 27.85 28.65 33.24
Effect Fixe Fixe Fixe Fixe Fixe
Threshold Classification of 20 %
%  correct 
predictions
57.14 66.67 73.13 78.50   86.79
% crises 
correctly 
predicted
55.94 64.08 69.61 77.38 84.34
% flase alerts 72.41 60.66 53.45 50.00 37.14
Ratio Noise/
signal
1.29 0.95 0.77 0.65 0.44
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Notes:  Ratio noise / signal =% false alarms compared to the % of correct crises ;  
t-statistic significant at the threshold of (***) 1%, (**) 5% and (*) 10%; () Coeffi-
cients.
Source: Authors’ own work
Table 6.  Estimation Results of Logit Models of Banking Crises over the Period 2007-
2012
Model (17) :  Dependent Variable 
Variables Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) Model (d) Model (e)
returnst
-3.05***
(-0.029013)
-2.18**
(-0.030984)
1.81*
(0.029756)
1.65*
(0.043033)
1.83*
(0.064246)
gdpgt
-2.61***
(-0.197041)
-0.50
(-0.162857)
-3.72***
(-0.168214)
-0.35
(-0.173729)  
-0.70
(-0.189329)
rirt
0.82
(0.072584)
2.38**
(0.123538)
2.91***
(0.288707)
0.64
(0.213353)
-2.23**
(-0.18926)
vert
2.77
(0.048038)
2.63***
(0.069458)
1.49
(0.049240)
0.81
(0.052523)
2.20**
(0.063600)
privcreditt
4.23***
(0.062747)  
2.89***
(0.078891)
2.77***
(0.136620)
2.21**
(0.153550)
ratiocreditdepositt
2.30** 
(0.002265)
2.35**
(0.003617)
0.15
(0.00610)
0.05
(0.003404)
ratiodepositm2
-4.28***
(-0.163423)
-4.92***
(-0.326412)
-2.70***
(-0.402322)
-2.06**
(-0.47472)  
ratiocapitalt
-1.73*
(-0.773069)
-1.92*
(-0.817551)
roet
-1.78*
(-0.098542)
-2.19**
(-0.087473)
ratiocostrevenut
2.15**
(0.108559)
1.87*
(0.112308)  
m2rest
0.83
(0.019715)
0.11
(0.015443)
Banking Crises of the 1990s and 2000s in Developed Countries: How similar are they?
97Volume 5   Number 2   Fall 2015
exterdebtt
3.21***
(0.004038)
0.29
(0.007143)
opnesst
3.75***
(0.206525)
-1.63
(-0.126561)
dfit
-1.88*
(-0.147975)
  -0.33 
(-0.092384) 
Number of crises 3 16 16 16 16
Observation 158 186 183 145 138
Log-likelihood -38.99 -47.80 -37.62 -17.91 -15.38
LR chi2 29.10 75.89 97.50 76.39 78.60
 chi2 of Hausman 
test 
12.10 26.85 38.72 42.58 41.75
Effect Fixe Fixe Fixe Fixe Fixe
Threshold Classification of 20 %
%  correct 
predictions
48.30 46.67 60.64 72.66 70.80
% crises correctly 
predicted
38.46 60.00 50.76 69.00 62.37
% flase alerts 69.36 58.12 58.04 49.21 47.30
Ratio Noise/signal 1.80 0.97 1.14 0.71 0.76
Notes:  Ratio noise / signal =% false alarms compared to the % of correct crises ; 
t-statistic significant at the threshold of (***) 1%, (**) 5% and (*) 10%; () Coefficients.
Source: Authors’ own work
Furthermore, the estimation results of model (16.e) show that a drop in the ratio of 
the money supply to foreign reserves and a higher degree of openness to international 
trade are good indicators of banking crises. These results contradict the theoretical 
and empirical literature, notably the work of Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) who show 
that the majority of countries that were affected by the banking crises suffered declines 
in their international trading of at least 10%, and a growth in the money-supply-to-
foreign-reserve ratio.
The estimation results of model (17.d) show that the growth of market returns is that 
only macroeconomic variable that is a good predictor of banking crises at 10%. This 
contradicts the work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), which shows that the period 
preceding financial crises is generally characterized by fluctuations in equity prices of 
about 40% compared to those recorded during non-crisis periods. However, these 
results corroborate those of Caballero (2010) and Claessens and al. (2010b) who found 
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that asset prices in the United States and other advanced countries grew by over 30% 
before the 2008 crisis to reach a threshold of over 60% just before the onset of the 
crisis.
Similarly, the estimation results of model (17.d) show that significant bank credit 
growth and a decrease in the deposit-to-M2-money-supply ratio are robust banking 
crisis indicators. Indeed, these results are broadly consistent with the work of Davis 
and Karim (2008) who argue that, working for profit maximization, the banks would 
lower their requirements for credit granting, offering risky loans to clients who are not 
necessarily creditworthy. In consequence, with interest rates growing, many borrowers 
would find themselves unable to meet their obligations. A significant percentage of 
loans would therefore become doubtful accounts, deteriorating the banks’ balance 
sheets, which in turn would cause investors to lose confidence in the banking system. 
As a result, a bank-run will follow.
In addition, the estimation results of model (17.d) suggest that a higher ratio of costs 
to bank revenue, a decrease in the ratio of capital to total bank assets, and a smaller 
ratio of financial result to equity costs are robust banking crisis result indicators. These 
results are significantly compatible with the work of Männasoo and Mayes (2009) and 
Barrell and al. (2008).
In summary, as our results show, it seems that the only points shared between the 
banking crises of 2008 and those of the 90s in advanced countries are: private credit 
boom and the deterioration of bank balance quality measured by the decrease of the 
capital ratio, and the growth of the cost-benefit ratio. 
Furthermore, unlike past crises, neither slowed economic activity, nor external shocks 
seem to have contributed to triggering the 2000s banking crises. Indeed, these crises 
seem to have been caused by the overvaluation of financial asset prices that had reached 
dizzyingly high levels. 
Our results also validate the relevance of aggregated accounting indicators in the onset 
of banking crises in advanced economies. Indeed, the insufficiency of net equity leads 
to an increase in banking institutions’ exposure to various sources of risk, such as, for 
example, credit risk, market risk, and operational risk, which reduces their ability to 
deal with shocks affecting their balance sheets (Gonzalez-Hermosillo and al., 1997 and 
Barrell and al., 2008). Similarly, the growth of banking costs relative to operating 
revenue reflects the ineffectiveness of the operational procedures used by bank directors 
and, more generally, the inefficient management of banking institutions. This can 
lead to deterioration of the institutions’ profitability (Hays and al., 2009). However, 
the decrease in the financial profitability ratio, measured by the relation between the 
financial income and equity, does not seem to be a relevant indicator in cases of past 
crises. The decline of this ratio is generally a precursor to solvency problems (Grier, 
2007).
We have tested, secondly, the robustness of the estimation results of multivariate logit 
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models for the two periods under consideration in this study by means of Bayesian 
model averaging (BMA).
Indeed, BMA has the advantage of taking into account different model combinations, 
weighting them according to their adjustments in the model. In addition, the BMA 
approach allows the estimation of each variable’s coefficients as weighted averages of the 
group of models included in the model space. Thus, if we have 14 variables, the model 
space will consist of 214 models, meaning 16 384 models. The weighting coefficients 
correspond to the posterior inclusion probability in each model in the model space. 
The estimation results of model (18) more specifically the posterior inclusion 
probabilities (PIP), the expected posterior parameter values, the conditional posterior 
sign as well as the posterior variance parameters, are given in Tables  7 and 8. The 
estimation results of model 18.a that correspond to the 1990-2006 period are given 
in Table 7. According to table 7, the estimation results of the BMA model are broadly 
consistent with the results of model (16.e) by the multivariate logit approach (Table 5). 
Table 7. Estimation Results of BMA Models of Banking Crises over the Period 1990-
2006 (Model 18.b)
Variables PIP Post Mean Post SD Cond.Pos.Sign
gdpgt 0.9999999 -0.13353645 0.02089559 0
rirt 0.9999724 0.15534119 0.0269798 1
opnesst 0.8992601 0.0159717 0.00849031 1
privcreditt 0.8288625 0.10632599 0.07031128 0.9999322
ratiocapitalt 0.8215073 -0.15760263 0.10689843 0.00000031
vert 0.6635472 0.02450355 0.02557618 1
m2rest 0.6123305 0.03553483 0.04380036 1
ratiocostrevenut 0.5005264 0.16522002 0.25460909 1
ratiocreditdepositt 0.4758206 -0.0023855 0.00419197 0.00015362
returnt 0.4744605 -0.02688313 0.05047469 0.01499962
ratiodepositm2 0.4728869 -0.42110641 0.71890055 0.01872499
exterdebtt 0.4341035 0.0042335 0.00830433 0.99952015
dfit 0.3947972 0.09860624 0.29774734 0.93293309
roet 0.375888 0.01361733 0.08101365 0.8047804
Note: PIP, Post Mean, Cond.Pos.Sign denote subsequently inclusion probability, a 
posteriori average, a posteriori variance and conditional posterior sign.
Source: Authors’ own work
Similarly, the estimation results of model 18.b, which cover the 1990-2006 period are 
given in Table 8. According to table 8, the estimation results of the BMA model are 
broadly consistent with the results of model (17.d) by the multivariate logit approach 
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(Table 6). In contrast, contrary to the estimation results of the logit approach, which 
suggest the non-robustness of real interest rate growth as a banking crisis indicator, 
the estimation results of the BMA model confirm the relevance of this indicator. 
Furthermore, for most of the models in the BMA model space, the ratio of credit to 
banking deposits is significantly positive, unlike the results of the logit model. 
Table 8. Estimation Results of the BMA Models of Banking Crises over the Period 
2007-2012 (Model 18.b
Variables PIP Post Mean Post SD Cond.Pos.Sign
ratiocostrevenut 1 0.17269815 0.02548505 1
ratiodepositm2 1 -0.30048066 0.04172048 0
privcreditt 0.963872 0.09407296 0.03701112 1
roet 0.9478391 -0.04140546 0.0178719 0
returnt 0.9076954 0.03398578 0.01724719 1
ratiocapitalt 0.7594058 -0.18177464 0.14174879 0
rirt 0.6213379 0.11407877 0.11885064 0.99985226
vert 0.4711599 0.01748926 0.02687917 1
m2rest 0.4499 0.02694111 0.04367449 0.98589573
opnesst 0.3439876 -0.01128604 0.01347132 0.03099666
gdpgt 0.3426264 -0.09407158 0.26462416 0.00288535
ratiocreditdepositt 0.3085081 -0.00381585 0.01715114 0.04506733
exterdebtt 0.3025314 0.00124951 0.00903262 0.8971883
dfit 0.299575 -0.08117392 1.66181598 0.27757243
Note: PIP, Post Mean, Cond.Pos.Sign denote subsequently inclusion probability, a 
posterior average, a posterior variance and conditional sign-post.
Source: Authors’ own work
We may, in consequence, conclude that the results of the BMA approach, for the two 
studied periods, are broadly consistent with those obtained by the multivariate logit 
approach. Indeed, most of the indicators identified as good predictors of banking crises 
have preserved their sign and significance by means of the BMA approach. We can thus 
confirm the robustness of the estimation results of the multivariate logit approach. We 
can also conclude that the BMA approach is robust and can be used as an alternative 
to limited dependent variable models (logit) as an early warning system for banking 
crises.
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Conclusion
This work provides a new perspective on banking crises by, on one hand, determining 
if the 2006-2007 banking crises in advanced economies have shared roots with the 
crises of the 90s, and, on the other hand, testing the relevance of aggregated accounting 
indicators in explaining these crises.
To this end, we have, first, identified banking crises indicators by means of a logit 
limited dependent variable approach on a cross-section of advanced economies during 
the period 1990-2006, which precedes the onset of the banking crises of 2007- 
2008, and during the period 2007-2012. Our results suggest the presence of certain 
similarities between the banking crises of 2007-2008 and the crises occurring in 
advanced economies in the 90s, which are: private credit boom and the deterioration 
of bank balance sheet strength, measured by a decrease in the capital ratio and a rise 
in the cost-benefit ratio. Furthermore, neither slowing down of economic activity nor 
external shocks seems to have contributed to triggering the banking crises of the 2000s, 
unlike past episodes of crises. Our results also validate the relevance of aggregated 
accounting indicators in the onset of banking crises in advanced economies.
Second, we have tested the robustness of results derived from the multivariate logit 
approach through Bayesian model averaging (BMA). In effect, the BMA approach has 
the advantage of taking into account model uncertainty by considering different model 
combinations, weighting them according to their adjustments in the model (Crespo 
Cuaresma and Slacik, 2009; and Babecký and al., 2012). 
The results of the BMA approach have allowed confirmation of the robustness of 
the multivariate logit approach’s estimation results, because most of the indicators 
identified as good predictors of banking crises by the logit approach have preserved 
their sign and significance through the BMA approach. We can also conclude that 
the BMA approach is robust and can be used as an alternative to limited dependent 
variable models (logit) as an early warning system for banking crises.
This study is not exhaustive. A possible extension of this research could be to test the 
predictive powers of the identified banking crisis indicators beyond our sample.
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